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Abstract
This article examines the Brexit process through the anthropological lens of liminality. As
a concept that explains the impact of change and transformation on human experience, it is
argued that liminality is an especially valuable perspective to understand better the phe-
nomenon of Brexit, particularly as to how this might impact on the regulation of human
health research. A central feature of liminality is its attention to process; that is, the
identification of milestone thresholds within a series of events involving change. More
particularly, liminality has a degree of predictive power about certain influencing factors on
transformational processes and their outcomes. In this regard, the pivotal role of law is
subjected to close scrutiny in the period leading up toMarch 29, 2018: one year before the
so-called Brexit Day. The European Union (EU) (Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2017
was the threshold trigger for the Brexit process, while the EUWithdrawal Bill 2017–2019
has as its objective the shepherding through of the United Kingdom in its departure from
the EU. The argument is made that these events are liminal moments in European legal and
human history; moreover, lessons from history are used to identify the specific implica-
tions for human health research as an area of human activity that will be profoundly
impacted by the Brexit process. This analysis also provides a means to reflect on the
broader implications of what a disruptive process such as Brexit means for law generally.
Keywords
Health, research, regulation, law, liminality, Brexit
Received 21 December 2017; Revised 25 May 2018; Accepted 25 May 2018
Corresponding author:
Graeme Laurie, School of Law, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh EH8 9YL, UK.
Email: graeme.laurie@ed.ac.uk
Medical Law International
2018, Vol. 18(2-3) 110–134






How do we make sense of chaos? How do we navigate our way through—and out of—
one of the most complex legal orders ever devised in human history? More particularly,
how can we effectively find our way through—and potentially out of—one of the most
complex and yet highest-quality human health regulation regimes on the globe? These
are the questions that sit at the heart of this article. Normative quandaries aside about
why we would wish to set ourselves on such paths, the contribution of this article is to
suggest some tentative answers to these questions by invoking the anthropological
concept of liminality. Liminality is concerned with in-betweenness. More specifically,
it reflects and describes a human quality of being neither one thing nor another. As is
outlined below, liminality already offers powerful insights into the human condition as it
relates to health and illness, and I have recently written about how liminality can help us
to understand the role of law in regulating health and human health research.1 This article
builds on those analytical foundations, not merely by applying the insights to the Brexit
process but also by exploring more deeply what liminality teaches us about processes of
transition and change, particularly when those processes are shrouded in uncertainty and,
at times, chaos.
The article proceeds as follows. The first section considers the landscape of human
health research as a suitable area of enquiry and highlights issues and questions that arise
for that regulatory space from the Brexit process. The second section outlines the nature
and the contribution of liminality to the sphere of health-related human experience, and it
identifies key features of that experience that are revealed by the lens of liminality; these
include a focus on process, transformation, and change. Here, liminality is offered as a
diagnostic of what is happening within the Brexit process. The third section uses this
analysis as a prediction of what might happen for health research regulation as a result of
the liminality of Brexit. The last section offers some tentative solutions to the challenges
of Brexit in the health research context, or, at least, some commentary about what might
be expected, and how adverse outcomes might be avoided or their impacts greatly
minimized.
Brexit and health research regulation: What is the problem
(and how does liminality help with the answer)?
To begin to understand the complexity of the Brexit process, even simply in terms of
the sheer number of issues that must be addressed and settled, it is sufficient to have
regard to the European Commission position papers published after the United King-
dom’s notification of its intention to leave the European Union (EU) on March 29,
2017.2 It is an understatement of considerable proportions to assert that the Brexit
1. G. Laurie, ‘Liminality and the Limits of Law in Health Research Regulation: What Are We
Missing in the Spaces In-between?’, Medical Law Review 25(1) (2017), pp. 47–72.
2. Commission position papers published after March 29, 2017. Available at: https://ec.europa.
eu/commission/brexit-negotiations_en (accessed 3 September 2018).
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process heaps complexity upon complexity, given that the EU legal order is itself
labyrinthine, reaching into every aspect of the lives of EU citizens. This is particularly
true in the domain of health, where the sphere of influence of the EU has grown
considerably over the years.3 It is a challenge for lawyers already to navigate the
myriad ways in which EU law impacts the health rights and entitlements of EU citizens
within and between member states, let alone to understand how these systems might be
disentangled without irrevocable damage to those rights and entitlements, for both
current and future citizens. When, in addition, we then ask: how do regimes of health
research regulation fit into this Gordian knot of laws and regulations, the challenges
seem all the more insurmountable.
However, it is legitimate to ask this question because health research regulation is a
particularly central feature among the contributions that the EU has made to the quality
of human lives in the post–World War II era, both regionally and globally. EU standards
represent gold standards for robust scientific and ethical research conduct worldwide.
It is therefore a serious concern that in the UK government’s public dialogue to date, the
focus of its attentions has been too narrowly concentrated on trade and security matters.4
Moreover, and as noted by the House of Commons Health and Social Care Committee in
its report—Brexit and Health and Social Care Inquiry: People & Process—there have
been confusing and mixed messages from the government about key future eventualities,
including whether the United Kingdom will remain in the European Medicines Agency.5
The depth of concern was well voiced through evidence from the King’s Fund to the
same Committee when it stated:
The UK has its own national regulatory agency, the Medicines and Healthcare products
Regulatory Agency (MHRA). However, this deals with national authorisations intended
for marketing only in the UK. The inclusion of EEA and EFTA countries for centralised
marketing authorisation may mean that, despite leaving the EU, the UK could continue its
relationship with the EMA. If this is not the case, however, pharmaceutical companies
may need to apply to the MHRA for authorisation for any medicines they wish to supply to
the UK. Concerns raised in a recent report from the UK life sciences sector included that
no longer being in the EU regulatory system could result in the UK becoming ‘a second
priority’ launch market, that ‘there is no appetite to add regulatory bureaucracy by losing
European scale and consistency’, and recommending that alignment with the EU
3. T.K. Hervey and J.V. McHale, European Union Health Law: Themes and Implications
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
4. Consider, notably, Prime Minister Theresa May’s speech in Florence on September 22, 2017.
Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pms-florence-speech-a-new-era-of-
cooperation-and-partnership-between-the-uk-and-the-eu. Official government documents on
the Brexit process (accessed 3 September 2018). Available at: https://www.gov.uk/
government/publications?departments%5B%5D¼department-for-exiting-the-european-
union (accessed 3 September 2018).
5. See House of Commons Select Committee on Health and Social Care, Brexit and Health and
Social Care Inquiry: People & Process, HC 640 (2016–2017), at paras 127–128.
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regulatory system be maintained (UK EU Life Sciences Transition Programme Steering
Group 2016).6
In its response to the Health and Social Care Committee report, the government
highlighted that Paul Macnaught, Director of EU, International & Public Health System
at the Department of Health, had provided oral evidence to the Health Committee on
February 28, 2017, wherein he listed the “ . . . biggest issues for the Department arising
from the UK’s withdrawal from the EU as including workforce, medicines and devices
regulation and the implications for the life sciences sector generally, reciprocal health-
care and health protection systems.”7 However, this response is notable for its silence in
failing to clarify the UK government’s position on any future involvement with the
European Medicines Agency.
Concerns were compounded because the work of the Health and Social Care Com-
mittee was suspended due to the General Election of June 8, 2017.8 Matters relating to
ongoing European research collaborations and funding, including matters of public
health, therefore were not addressed.
The report of the successor Committee—Brexit: Medicines, Medical Devices and
Substances of Human Origin—was published on March 21, 2018. Herein the call was
made that “ . . . to minimise harm to their citizens both sides should look to secure the
closest possible regulatory alignment as a priority in the next round of negotiations.”9 By
this stage, the UK government had also publicly stated its intention to maintain regula-
tory alignment with the European Medicines Agency. Furthermore, the House of Com-
mons (HC) Select Committee also recommended:
The UK should also seek mutual recognition of pharmacovigilance mechanisms by the
MHRA and the EMA as a priority in the next round of negotiations. This should include
ensuring that all UK pharmacovigilance organisations continue to be members of the
6. Written Evidence from the King’s Fund (BRE0090), at para 3.7. Available at: http://data.
parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/health-committee/
brexit-and-health-and-social-care/written/42703.html (accessed 3 September 2018).
7. Government response to the House of Commons Health and Social Care Committee report
Brexit and Health and Social Care—People & Process, December 2017, Cm 9469, p. 2.
8. House of Commons Select Committee on Health and Social Care, Brexit and Health and
Social Care Inquiry: People & Process, at para 142. As the Committee stated:
Questions remain over the UK’s continued participation in health-related EU research programmes
such as those investigating rare diseases that rely on large sample populations.156 The financial
support for cross border work such as that provided by the European Investment Bank, Horizon
2020 funding, EU public health programmes, the European Social Fund and the Regional Devel-
opment Fund is also in question. We believe that these are all areas that will require scrutiny by our
successor committee.
9. House of Commons Select Committee on Health and Social Care, Brexit: Medicines, Medical
Devices and Substances of Human Origin, Fourth Report, HC 392 (March 21, 2018).
Available at: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmhealth/392/39202.
htm (accessed 3 September 2018).
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European Network of Centres for Pharmacoepidemiology and Pharmacovigilance
(ENCePP), as the failure to do so could affect patient safety both in the UK and the EU.10
Bearing in mind that the political position that overshadows the Brexit negotiations is
that “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed” and that there will be no special
pleading on a sector-by-sector basis, the HC Select Committee urged the UK govern-
ment to make this sector a priority in the ongoing negotiations and “ . . . to secure . . . the
closest possible regulatory alignment with the EU.”11 These processes of “regulatory
alignment” and “mutual recognition” will be unpacked further in the third section.
At the time of writing, the government response to this report is still awaited. Impor-
tantly, in a separate letter, the HC Select Committee specifically requested clarity about
the details of a transition period and contingency planning in the event of “no deal.”12
The expectation is that this will be included within the response to the report.
For present purposes, the point should be self-evident that the need to address the
complexities of this field of health research regulation as part of Brexit is a matter of
crucial importance. This is not only a question of respecting and maintaining world-
leading standards and protecting patients but also because of the social and economic
benefits that this kind of health-related research brings. It is a long-standing expression
of the will of the UK government that the United Kingdom be seen as the “Go To” place
to conduct health research.13 The enduring appeal of the United Kingdom as such a
venue in a post-Brexit world must be considered carefully, and the “loss” of the Eur-
opean Medicines Agency from London to Amsterdam14 is but the start of the process to
come.
Why liminality?
How, then, can we effectively tackle questions of interconnected complexities and
processes of disentanglement? This article posits that a crucial starting point is to under-
stand what is happening at the fundamental level of the processes themselves. This is not
an empirical question; rather, it is a human experiential question. Whatever one’s polit-
ical persuasion, Brexit represents a moment in (European) human history of profound
seismic transformation and change. What can analysis of other profound processes of
10. House of Commons Select Committee on Health and Social Care, Brexit: Medicines,
Medical Devices and Substances of Human Origin, at para 131.
11. House of Commons Select Committee on Health and Social Care, Brexit: Medicines,
Medical Devices and Substances of Human Origin, at para 18.
12. House of Commons Select Committee on Health and Social Care, Brexit: Medicines,
Medical Devices and Substances of Human Origin, at para 4.
13. See generally information at GOV.UK on Research and Innovation in Health and Social
Care. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/policies/research-and-innovation-in-
health-and-social-care (accessed 3 September 2018).
14. European Medicines Agency, November 20, 2017. Available at: http://www.ema.europa.eu/
ema/index.jsp?curl¼pages/news_and_events/news/2017/11/news_detail_002857.jsp&
mid¼WC0b01ac058004d5c1 (accessed 3 September 2018).
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change in the human condition possibly teach us about Brexit and its impact on human
health research?
This brings us to liminality. Fittingly, we can use a further example of a monumental
social—and literally seismic—change to provide an introduction to this concept. In his
work, Liminality and the Modern,15 anthropologist Bjørn Thomassen examines the
social and political impacts of the 1755 Lisbon earthquake. As one of the worst natural
disasters in human history, claiming anything between 10,000 and over 100,000 lives,
the ramifications of this event throughout Europe and beyond were profound for the
rupture with status quo thinking at the time that the earthquake caused: It transformed
how humans saw their relationship with the natural world. The earthquake was changed:
. . . [from] brutal fact to a complex cultural sign, redirecting material and mental processes
in Europe and merging with the complex contemporary scientific and political develop-
ments that secured its long-term relevance.16
Direct impacts from the event included profound shifts in philosophical and political
thinking about the dominance of man’s control over social progress.17 Thomassen iden-
tifies this as a liminal moment in human history. The Europe before the Lisbon earth-
quake was radically different to the Europe that emerged afterward. Citing a series of
other social and personal examples, he suggests that liminality “ . . . captures something
essential about the imprecise and unsettled situation of transitoriness.”18 This mirrors
precisely the character of the Brexit negotiations at the time of writing. Anthropological
studies and other works show that the liminal—transitional—phase in moments of
profound change—the in-betweenness, if you will—has particular characteristics that
are addressed in the next section.
What is liminality anyway?
Thomassen points out that at the heart of an understanding of liminality are two features:
experience and transition. Thus:
To experience something means, etymologically, to go through something. Any discussion
of liminality must therefore engage with experience. To take liminality seriously means to
take experience seriously . . . .19
15. B. Thomassen, Liminality and the Modern: Living Through the In-Between (Farnham:
Ashgate, 2014).
16. Op. cit., p. 99.
17. There is even evidence of it impacting the works of Kant; the suggestion is that the trope in
Kant’s work of the struggle of humanity with the chaos of the natural world is attributable to
the influence of this event, Thomassen, Liminality and the Modern: Living Through the In-
Between, p. 99.
18. Thomassen, Liminality and the Modern: Living Through the In-Between, p. 5 (emphasis
added). Here Thomassen also cites A. Horvarth, Modernism and Charisma (Basingstoke:
Palgrave McMillan, 2013), p. 10.
19. Thomassen, Liminality and the Modern: Living Through the In-Between, p. 5.
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Moreover, as its Latin origins suggest, liminality is about thresholds: the limen. With
the crossing of a threshold comes a transition arising from the experience. At the macro-
societal level of the Lisbon earthquake, this transition was extensive and far-reaching for
communities.
The intellectual father of our understandings of liminality is Arnold van Gennep. In
his 1908 book, Rites of Passage, van Gennep argued that in moments of profound
transition in human life, a schema of three distinct stages characterizes the processes
involved. Drawing on an extensive range of ethnographic evidence from tribal commu-
nities, van Gennep characterized these stages relative to the rites that accompanied them.
The paradigm examples to consider are rites of passage from childhood to adulthood.
Thus, there are
. . . the [i] rites of separation from a previous world, preliminal rites, those executed during
the [ii] transitional stage liminal (or threshold) rites, and the [iii] ceremonies of incorpora-
tion into the new world post-liminal rites.20
The crossing of a threshold into the liminal sphere signified change. It represented
rupture with the past. It was characterized by uncertainty and was potentially chaotic.
Thus, for van Gennep, rituals were important, first, to manage potential chaos and,
second, to help those going through a transformation to navigate the process. In this
respect, a key figure to emerge from the ethnographic studies was the Master of Cere-
monies who took on this role as steward through the liminal process.
Later writers, notably Turner,21 Thomassen,22 and Szakolczai23 demonstrated exten-
sively that liminality is not only a feature of tribal cultures, it is also a constant feature of
modern human societies, and it impacts on the entire phenomenon of human existence.
For example, Turner argued persuasively that in liminal moments social structure is
20. A. van Gennep, The Rites of Passage (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), p. 21.
Emphasis as in original text.
21. This article cannot do justice to the contributions of Victor Turner to the development of the
concept of liminality, but key texts include V. Turner, The Ritual Process: Structure and
Anti-Structure (Piscataway, New Jersey: Aldine Transaction, 1969) for the direct
continuation of van Gennep’s work with tribal communities. Beyond the tribal studies
context, see V. Turner, From Ritual to Theatre: The Human Seriousness of Play (New
York: PAJ Books, 1982), V. Turner, The Anthropology of Performance (New York: PAJ
Books, 1986). Commentaries on the contributions of Turner include B.C. Alexander, Victor
Turner Revisited: Ritual as Social Change (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991) and
G. St. John, Victor Turner and Contemporary Cultural Performance (New York: Berghahn
Books, 2008).
22. Thomassen, Liminality and the Modern: Living Through the In-Between (Ashgate, 2014).
See also, A. Horvath, B. Thomassen and H. Wydra (eds), Breaking Boundaries: Varieties of
Liminality (New York: Berghahn, 2015).
23. A. Szakolczai, ‘Liminality and Experience: Structuring Transitory Situations and
Transformative Events’, International Political Anthropology 2(1) (2009), pp. 141–172;
A. Szakolczai, ‘Permanent (Trickster) Liminality: The Reasons of the Heart and of the
Mind’, Theory and Psychology 27(2) (2017), pp. 231–248.
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replaced by anti-structure—that is, there is a breaking down of preexisting norms and the
opening up of possibilities in the processes of transformation and change.
A key feature of liminal understanding is the notion of the processual. That is, the
focus is on the dynamics of human experience toward a particular end point, and
the place of liminality is relative to that experience. Ultimately, there is emergence at
the other side of a defined process. Thus, in ceremonial liminality involving rites and a
Master of Ceremonies such as that described by van Gennep, there is a clear end point to
the processual experience; usually, a change of status.
However, liminality is present even if the end point is not known or clear when
liminality is triggered by crisis or chaos. From all of this, three important features about
liminality emerge: these are the prospect of (i) permanent liminality, (ii) the risk of the
rise of the Trickster, and (iii) a tendency toward imitative pattern of behavior in the
absence of a clear path to follow out of liminality, also known as mimesis.24 First, as
argued by Szakolczai, if for whatever reasons there is no “leading out” of liminality by a
Master of Ceremonies, then the result can be permanent liminality, for which we might
read permanent crisis or chaos.25 Turner also commented on the failure to complete the
processual, leading to schism in society, or sectors thereof, and a “splitting off” of
groups.26 This speaks to the importance of having some sense of the telos of the pro-
cessual, that is, what is the transformation or concrete change that is sought.
Second, as to the riseof theTrickster, numerouswriters point out that in times of crisis, the
role of Master of Ceremonies—or more generically Representative of Order—is an attrac-
tive prospect for actors whowould exploit the uncertainty of liminality for their own ends.27
Finally, as to mimesis, that is, imitative patterns of behavior, liminality itself and certainly
sustained periods of, or permanent, liminality can provoke unreflexive copying of action.
I have considered elsewhere the implication of applying liminal analysis to law.28
Writing on law as process in 1978, Sally Falk Moore put it thus:
Awareness of the limitations on regulation should affect the research objective of those
responsible for drawing up rules, predicting their effects, and monitoring their application.
A central concern of any rule-maker should be the identification of the social processes
which operate outside the rules, or which cause people to use rules, or abandon them, bend
them, reinterpret them, side-step them, or replace them. To recognize that such processes
24. R. Girard, Violence and the Sacred (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1979) provides a very full account of mimetic affect and behavior in ancient and more recent
cultures.
25. A. Szakolczai, Reflexive Historical Sociology (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 220. The author
argues that there are, in fact, three types of permanent liminality corresponding to the three
phases of rites of passage.
26. V. Turner, From Ritual to Theatre: The Human Seriousness of Play (New York: PAJ
Books, 1982), p. 104.
27. See L. Ellis, ‘Trickster: Shaman of the Liminal’, Studies in American Indian Literatures 5(4)
(1993), pp. 55–68. For western societal accounts, see also Thomassen, Liminality and the
Modern: Living Through the In-Between, pp. 103–105.
28. See Laurie, ‘Liminality and the Limits of Law in Health Research Regulation.
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are inescapable aspects of the use of rule-systems and to try to understand as much as
possible about the conditions of their operation would probably be far more effective than
taking the view that such activities might be fully controlled simply by tighter drafting of
‘loophole-less’ legislation. Social transactions usually take place in the service of objectives
to which legal rules are merely ancillary shapers, enablers, or impediments. Conformity to
the rules is seldom in itself the central objective.29
This is a call to understand the wider social processes and the need for interaction and
dynamics in the development of such (legal) processes. In the health research context,
these social processes are both ethical and legal processes about fundamental respect for
persons as participants throughout the life cycle of human health research, and it is about
the processual challenge of bringing about social value from human health research and
from the act of participation itself. Liminality—as a processual phenomenon—draws
attention to each step of a process; it requires the identification of a telos for the process
in question, and it raises our awareness of likely risks if liminality is created sponta-
neously or from crisis and/or results in chaos itself. Liminality reminds us also of the
crucial role of the need for a Representative of Order, and the ever-present threat of the
Trickster, or multiple manifestations thereof.
Brexit is quintessentially a liminal moment in (European) human history.30 Moreover,
given the above analysis, liminality raises a number of questions about the Brexit
process. On its likely impact on the future of health research regulation, key questions
include
– What is the end point of the liminal process created by Brexit?
– How long will the liminality of Brexit last?
– Which process—or indeed processes—are in play?
– Who is the (legitimate) Representation of Order?
– What is the role of law in the Brexit process, seen as an aspect of liminality?
– Overarchingly, can law manage the chaos that is Brexit?
What does liminality predict about Brexit?
This section attempts to answer the above questions, as of the date of writing (March 29,
2018).
What is the end point of the liminal process created by Brexit, and for how long
will it last?
Multiple ironies emerged from the United Kingdom General Election of June 8, 2017,
held in the attempt “to strengthen the hand” of Prime Minister Theresa May after the
29. S. Falk Moore, Law as Process: An Anthropological Approach (Oxford: Oxford University
Press for the International African Institute, 1978), p. 4.
30. D. Edward, ‘In Europe History is the Unseen Guest at Every Table’, Common Market Law
Review 55(2/1) (2018), pp. 251–261.
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Conservative government had given notice of its intention to leave the EU on March 29,
2017. Principal among these ironies was the backfire in rhetoric against the Conservative
Party that had labeled the Opposition a “Coalition of Chaos.” Significant lack of progress
in EU-UK negotiations in phase 1,31 absence of sectoral impact assessments about the
effects of Brexit (first stated to exist, then denied),32 a defeat in the HC on a decisive
parliamentary vote on any final Brexit deal,33 no fewer than 10 defeats in the House of
Lords on key provisions of the Withdrawal Bill,34 and the ever-present prospect of a “cliff-
edge” no-deal outcome,35 all fed newspaper headlines about the chaotic nature of the
Brexit process. While agreement to move to phase 2 negotiations was reached on Decem-
ber 8, 2017,36 this was but the end of the beginning of the process outlined by Article 50
TEU. This short article itself imposes a hard 2-year deadline as follows in Article 50(3):
The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry into force of
the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification referred to in
paragraph 2, unless the European Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned,
unanimously decides to extend this period.
Any discretion to vary this is within the gift of the European Council.37 There is much
discussion, especially within the United Kingdom, of March 29, 2019, as being “Brexit
Day” on a literal interpretation of this provision. However, the matter is not so simple,
and two examples serve to illustrate this. First, Theresa May’s Florence speech contained
31. BBC News, Whatever Happened to the Brexit Talks?, January 22, 2018. Available at: http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-42778234 (accessed 3 September 2018).
32. BBC News, Impact Assessments of Brexit on the UK “don’t exist,” December 6, 2017.
Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-42249854 (accessed 3 September
2018).
33. BBC News, ‘Brexit Bill: Government Loses Key Vote After Tory Rebellion’, December 13,
2017. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-42346192 (accessed 3 September
2018).
34. BBC News, Brexit: Government Defeat in Lords Over Terms of Meaningful Vote, April 30,
2018. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-43951405 (accessed 3 September
2018).
35. See, for example, the sustained concern by the House of Commons Select Committee on
Health and Social Care in its most recent report in which it repeatedly calls for the
government to share its contingency planning in the event of such an outcome, House of
Commons Select Committee on Health and Social Care, Brexit: Medicines, Medical Devices
and Substances of Human Origin.
36. Joint Report from the Negotiators of the European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom
Government on Progress during Phase 1 of Negotiations under Article 50 TEU on the United
Kingdom’s Orderly Withdrawal from the EU, December 8, 2017, TF50 (2017) 19. Available
at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/joint_report.pdf (accessed 3
September 2018).
37. See further, Terms of Reference for the Article 50 negotiations, as agreed on June 19, 2017.
Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/eu-uk-art-50-terms-
reference_agreed_amends_en.pdf (accessed 3 September 2018).
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a proposal for an “implementation,” that is, transitional period of around 2 years after
withdrawal to determine the nature of the “new future partnership” that the United
Kingdom proposes, without details as to what exactly that partnership would entail (nor
with explanation of how it would conform to EU law). So, this would extend the Brexit
process by double: from 2 years to 4 years. To be clear, the United Kingdom would no
longer be a formal member of the EU from March 29, 2019, but its then uncertain status
in formulating its partnership with the EU would endure a further 2 years.38
Thus, to attempt to answer the first part of the question at hand—what is the end point
of the Brexit process?—we currently have only the vaguest of answers from the United
Kingdom. Recall from the earlier discussion that the HC Select Committee on Health
and Social Care wrote specifically to the government requesting clarification about its
contingency planning in the event of a “cliff edge” withdrawal and specifically with
respect to matter of medicines, devices, and public health.39
Despite extensive and groundless speculation, two points of clarity did, however,
emerge from Theresa May’s Florence speech about what is not envisioned: (i) seeking
membership of the European Economic Area40 and (ii) seeking an “ambitious” free trade
agreement, going further than any existing trade agreements between the EU and third
countries. For example, as May pointed out:
As for a Canadian style free trade agreement, we should recognise that this is the most
advanced free trade agreement the EU has yet concluded and a breakthrough in trade
between Canada and the EU. But, compared with what exists between Britain and the
EU today, it would nevertheless represent such a restriction on our mutual market access
that it would benefit neither of our economies.
So, if the status of the United Kingdom will not be either of these existing options,
what will it be? Even its status as a third country—that is, equivalent simply to a state
that has never been a member state of the EU—is not obvious. As a recent Editorial of
the Common Market Law Review comments:
There have been many analogies drawn with Brexit and divorce; but perhaps the converse
analogy is equally relevant: that a legal obligation extends beyond the date at which the
divorce takes effect because of the nature of the marriage that preceded it. At the edges of
the legal order, it becomes harder, but not always impossible, to decouple what constitutes a
38. For discussion, see Editorial Comments, ‘Theresa’s Travelling Circus: A Very British
Entertainment Trips Its Way from Florence to Brussels’, Common Market Law Review
54(6) (2017), pp. 1613–1626, and pp. 1619–1621.
39. House of Commons Select Committee on Health and Social Care, Brexit: Medicines,
Medical Devices and Substances of Human Origin.
40. On the arguments against this, see HM Government, Alternatives to Membership: Possible
Models for the United Kingdom Outside the European Union, (2016), pp. 16–21. Available
at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/alternatives-to-membership-possible-
models-for-the-united-kingdom-outside-the-european-union (accessed 3 September 2018).
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legal obligation and what is instead a choice made for political expediency and/or economic
security.41
As for the EU, Article 121 of the draft Withdrawal Agreement specifies December 31,
2020, as the end of the transition period,42 but this does not solve anything in that—if
agreement cannot be reached on all matters, and especially the complex question of
Northern Ireland—the withdrawal agreement negotiations fall apart entirely:
The European Council recalls that other issues still require agreement and negotiations can
only progress as long as all commitments undertaken so far are respected in full, and
welcomes in this respect Prime Minister May’s written assurances notably regarding Ire-
land/Northern Ireland.43
The end point—the telos—of Brexit is, then, still unclear. This is problematic from a
liminality perspective because it means that there is fundamental uncertainty about when,
where, how, and by whomUK citizens will be led out of uncertainty and the ensuing chaos.
The empty rhetoric of “taking back control” will eventually wear thin when rights and
entitlements are more substantively in play: when decisions eventually have to be taken.
Furthermore, it suggests that the prospect of permanent liminality does notmerely arisewith
a no-deal “cliff-edge”Brexit; unsettledmattersmaycontinue indefinitely.44Yet further still,
liminality predicts social schism in such extended periods of liminality. This could take the
form of sporadic civil unrest and/or further breakup of the United Kingdom itself.
Concerns about an extended period of liminality are compounded when we consider
that a key provision of the agreed phase 1 negotiations related to the ongoing jurisdiction
of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU):
The Agreement should also establish a mechanism enabling UK courts or tribunals to
decide, having had due regard to whether relevant case-law exists, to ask the CJEU ques-
tions of interpretation of those rights where they consider that a CJEU ruling on the question
is necessary for the UK court or tribunal to be able to give judgment in a case before it. This
mechanism should be available for UK courts or tribunals for litigation brought within 8
years from the date of application of the citizens’ rights Part.45
41. Editorial, ‘Polar Exploration: Brexit and the Emerging Frontiers of EU Law’, Common
Market Law Review 55(1) (2018), pp. 1–16.
42. Draft Agreement on the Withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, March 19,
2018, TF50 (2018) 35. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/
files/draft_agreement_coloured.pdf (accessed 3 September 2018).
43. See, the European Council Guidelines (Brussels, December 15, 2017 (OR. en) EUCO XT
20011/17). Available at: http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/XT-20011-2017-
INIT/en/pdf, at para 1 (accessed 3 September 2018).
44. Hervey, T.K. (2018) The Immediate Futures of EU Health Law in the UK after Brexit.
Medical law International. Available at: http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/119455/
45. JointReport from theNegotiators of theEuropeanUnion and theUnitedKingdomGovernment on
Progress during Phase 1 of Negotiations under Article 50 TEU on the United Kingdom’s Orderly
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As of March 19, 2018, Article 151 of the draft Agreement on Withdrawal embodied
this in the following manner:
1. Where, in a case which has commenced at first instance within 8 years from the
end of the transition period before a court or tribunal in the United Kingdom, a
question is raised concerning the interpretation of Part Two of this Agreement,
and where that court or tribunal considers that a decision on that question is
necessary to enable it to give judgment in that case, it may request the CJEU
to give a preliminary ruling on that question. However, where the subject matter
of the case before a court or tribunal in the United Kingdom is a decision on an
application made pursuant to Article 17 paragraphs (1) or (4) or Article 17a, a
request for a preliminary ruling may be made only where the case has com-
menced at first instance within 8 years from the date from which Article 17a
applies.
2. The CJEU shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings on requests pursuant
to paragraph 1. The legal effects in the United Kingdom of such preliminary
rulings shall be the same as the legal effects of preliminary rulings given pursuant
to Article 267 TFEU in the Union and its member states.
Thus, the reach and influence of the EU’s judicial arm will therefore be felt long after
the United Kingdom ceases to be a member state. If this provokes a domestic political
rebellion and forces a hard Brexit, then we are back to a position of permanent liminality
for the United Kingdom and the prospect of continued chaos. As to what will happen
internally in the United Kingdom with respect to law and governance, this question is
picked up again in section “What is the role of law in managing the chaos of the Brexit
process, seen as an aspect of liminality?”46
Which process—or indeed processes—are in play?
It is all too easily forgotten that Brexit is also a process for the Union institutions and the
EU27—it is virgin territory for the EU to lose a member state. Current indicators suggest,
however, that rather than causing chaos within EU27 leading to further disintegration,
Brexit is actually promoting better integration.47 And, when we begin to examine the
myriad areas where EU law has reach into member state laws, including the multiple
institutions, governance and regulatory mechanisms, reporting processes, and
Withdrawal from the European Union, December 8, 2017, at para 38. Available at: https://ec.
europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/joint_report.pdf (accessed 3 September 2018).
46. See generally on UK courts post-Brexit, T. Horsley ‘Brexit and UK Courts: Awaiting Fresh
Instruction’, in M. Dougan ed., The UK after Brexit: Legal and Policy Challenges, chapter 4,
(Cambridge: Intersentia, 2017), pp. 73–94.
47. See C. Hillion ‘Withdrawal under Article 50 TEU: An Integration-friendly Process’,
Common Market Law Review 54(2/1) (2018), pp. 29–56.
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enforcement procedures that are involved, we appreciate that “liminal hotspots”48 are
appearing across the EU’s legal and political domain. It is apposite, then, to consider the
domain of health research regulation as a particular exemplar.
The editors of the Common Market Law Review have recently reminded us of a truism
about law that echoes the earlier quote in this article from Falk Moore about law as
process:
. . . cooperation is not built merely on rules and regulations; it is also built on a complex
network of institutions and processes—political, administrative and judicial—which make
the whole system work in practice.49
Mention has already been made of the move of the European Medicines Agency from
London to Amsterdam. In the realm of health research regulation within which the EU
currently has influence with respect to the United Kingdom, there are multiple other
agencies and relationships whose future will have to be negotiated covering not just
pharmaceuticals but clinical trials,50 medical devices,51 advanced therapy medicinal
products,52 and data protection53 that underpins all of these fields. In respect of the first
and the last of the examples, we can speculate what Brexit might mean, and this is
addressed below in the third section of this article.
48. I am grateful to the insights of Paul Stenner for this expression used at a workshop of our
Liminal Spaces project, held in Edinburgh in May 2015, details here. Available at: http://
www.liminalspaces.ed.ac.uk/2015/07/01/190/ (accessed December 21, 2017). The event was
held as part of the Wellcome funded project ‘Confronting the Liminal Spaces of Health
Research Regulation’, Award No: WT103360MA. See, more recently, Szakolczai (2017),
Liminality and Experience: Structuring Transitory Situations and Transformative Events.
49. Polar Exploration: Brexit and the Emerging Frontiers of EU Law, Common Market Law
Review, p. 1620.
50. Council Regulation (EU) 536/2014 of April 16, 2014, on clinical trials on medicinal products
for human use, and repealing Directive 2001/20/EC [2014] OJ L158/1.
51. Council Directive 90/385/EEC of June 20, 1990, on the approximation of the laws of the
Member States relating to active implantable medical devices [1990] OJ L189/17; Council
Directive of 93/42/EEC concerning medical devices [1993] OJ L169/1; and Council
Directive of October 27, 1998, on in vitro diagnostic medical devices [1998] OJ L331/1.
Proposals for reform can be followed here. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/growth/sectors/
medical-devices/regulatory-framework_en (accessed 3 September 2018).
52. Council Regulation 1394/2007 of November 13, 2007, on advanced therapy medicinal
products and amending Directive 2001/83/EC and Regulation (EC) No 726/2004 [2007]
OJ L324/121. Proposals for reform can be followed here. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/
health/human-use/advanced-therapies/index_en.htm (accessed 3 September 2018).
53. Council Directive 95/46/EC of October 24, 1995, on the protection of individuals with regard
to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data [1995] OJ L281/31.
The General Data Protection Regulation was adopted by the Council of the EU on April 8,
2016, and by the European Parliament on April 14, 2016. Content and legislative history
here. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/reform/index_en.htm
(accessed 3 September 2018).
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As a precursor to this discussion, it will be recalled that the UK government is yet to
respond formally to the HC Select Committee on Health and Social Care report on
Brexit: Medicines, Medical Devices and Substances of Human Origin from March
2018. A clear message from that report, however, is the imperative to seek regulatory
alignment between the post-Brexit UK regime and the EU models with respect to
agencies, standards, processes, and procedures impacting on all aspects of health
research regulation.54 This is both a metaphor for seeking some degree on continued
certainty from the Brexit chaos and a measure of faith in the legal models that have been
in operation to date in the health research context, at least for providing adequate and
acceptable degrees of safety, efficacy, and performance about the products of health
research, notably medicines and medical devices. As the Select Committee noted:
The UK’s absence from European decision-making could shift the regulatory environment
in Europe towards a more precautionary environment. Such a move could create both
opportunities and risks for the UK. However, the worst outcome would be for the UK to
become an isolated rule-taker in a more precautionary environment which is less supportive
of innovation.55
This led it to recommend the following:
We support the Government’s intention to negotiate a close relationship with the European
Union, including associate membership of the EMA. The UK, with the expertise and
capacity of the MHRA, has a great deal to offer its European partners. We believe this is
in the interests of citizens and governments on both sides of the negotiations and should be
prioritised in the next phase. Failure to achieve an ongoing collaboration would signal the
triumph of political ideology over patient care. In the context of continued collaboration
with the EMA and maintaining regulatory alignment, it will be in the interests of both sides
for the EMA to benefit from the expertise of the MHRA and to continue to allow partic-
ipation of UK representatives in decision making.56
Fears about the implications of unspecified temporal chaos for health research reg-
ulation include concerns that laboratories and industrial operations will relocate, that
researchers might stop coming to the United Kingdom, and that talent might flee.
Without a sense of status quo, there might also be implications within the United
Kingdom from a much more deregulated health research sector—equally for life
sciences researchers, clinicians, the NHS, and patients alike.
This kind of low-level panic about the unknown, and a desire to hold on to certainty
(irrespective of its foibles), is precisely what liminality is. A liminal perspective can hope
54. House of Commons Select Committee on Health and Social Care, Brexit: Medicines,
Medical Devices and Substances of Human Origin.
55. House of Commons Select Committee on Health and Social Care, Brexit: Medicines,
Medical Devices and Substances of Human Origin, at para 41.
56. House of Commons Select Committee on Health and Social Care, Brexit: Medicines,
Medical Devices and Substances of Human Origin, at para 45.
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neither to address the above concerns in terms of concrete responses nor to answer the
myriad of questions that arise from them. However, to the extent that law is often called
upon and relied upon to bring certainty from chaos, the liminal lens can be focused on
what expectations arise from these processes and what can reasonably be expected of law
and its actors as a result. This discussion occurs at a time when anxiety is mounting
because there are only questions—multiplying questions—and too few answers. Law is
but an instrument to put answers into effect, but it is a substitute for neither the political
will nor the social values that drive the processes of change. Brexit shows that we are
perhaps overestimating what law can resolve about these profound social shifts. In the
language of liminality, can law be the Representative of Order that liminality predicts we
require to lead us from chaos?
Who is the (legitimate) Representative of Order?
Manifestly, the specter of chaos is a recurrent theme in this article. One might reasonably
hold to the view that the architect of the chaos that is Brexit is former UK Prime Minister
David Cameron. He put the United Kingdom on the current path by announcing a
referendum to appease hard-liners within his own party. That decision was soon
exploited by various individuals, including Boris Johnston, Michael Gove, and Nigel
Farage—each manifestly acting in his or her own political self-interest under the guise of
seeking a return of sovereignty to the United Kingdom and a clarion call to “take back
control.”
Liminality warns us about the risk of the rise of the Trickster. As Thomassen
comments:
Tricksters are trained in upsetting the social order by reversing values, and via their rheto-
rical and theatrical skills. As weber recognized, in moments of radical social or political
change, in ‘out-of-the-ordinary-moments’, we see the emergence of charismatic leader-
ship . . . the trickster mimics charisma (Hovarth 2013: 9),57 and his magnetic powers must
certainly not be underestimated, hollow as they are . . .The analysis of the trickster as a
particularly dangerous type of political leader that may emerge in liminal situations, as
proposed by Hovarth (1998),58 may well represent a breakthrough in our understanding of
how liminal moments or period may be carried in dangerous directions.59
An almost instinctual understanding of this phenomenon has arisen precisely in the
context of Brexit. A 2017 Editorial from the Common Market Law Review commentary
on Theresa May’s Florence speech finishes thus:
. . . the Brexit circus continues to rattle along its merry way. And its most bizarre joke? It is
the clowns who are asking to see magic conjuring tricks from the bemused spectators—the
57. Horvarth, Modernism and Charisma.
58. A. Hovarth, ‘Tricking into the Position of the Outcast: A Case Study in the Emergence and
Effects of Communist Power’, Political Psychology 19(2) (1998), pp. 331–347.
59. Thomassen, Liminality and the Modern: Living Through the In-Between, p. 105.
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same spectators who never even wanted to watch this grotesque carnival in the first place.
Oh, those British—so droˆles . . . .60
It would be too easy to dismiss these comments as political sour grapes. The anthro-
pological point is that this phenomenon is predicted by liminality, and when tricksters
emerge, they take advantage of liminality. We must seek to counter this by various
practical measures at the highest political levels. However, in the context of this article,
the important point is that this trickster phenomenon might also occur within and across
the multiple liminal hotspots identified above within health research regulation. There is
therefore all the more need for representatives of order to lead stakeholders through the
liminal moment as an obvious counterpoint to this.
Thus, even if we cannot yet say what is the end point of the Brexit process for the
United Kingdom as an international state actor, we can still recognize micolevel liminal
spaces and seek to identify appropriate end points and telos of the associated liminal
processes that are being created as a direct and indirect result of Brexit. For example, I
have argued elsewhere with colleagues that there is an important role for regulatory
stewardship in health research regulation, that is, the need for identified actors to work
with researchers to help guide them through the regulatory landscape.61 I suggest here
that this becomes all the more crucial in the liminal periods of transition as the United
Kingdom leaves the EU. This might mean, for example, an increased role for regulators
such as the Health Research Authority, the agents of the Medicines & Healthcare prod-
ucts Regulatory Agency, the Human Tissue Authority, and the Information Commis-
sioner’s Office in navigating particular hotspot areas of health research regulation with
respect to their specific fields of competence and influence. This is both a regulatory and
a political issue. It is self-evident that the regulators ought to act proactively within their
own sectors to ensure compliance and to promote sound research; the less obvious role is
where and how they might assume increased roles as political actors. Consider, however,
that this tacit assumption is already emerging. A key recommendation from the Health
and Social Care Committee report in March 2018 sought to place the MHRA in a crucial
position with respect to ongoing negotiations and future influence in the formation and
implementation of EU medicines policy:
In the context of continued collaboration with the EMA and maintaining regulatory align-
ment, it will be in the interests of both sides for the EMA to benefit from the expertise of the
MHRA and to continue to allow participation of UK representatives in decision making.62
And what of the law in all of this? As asked previously, can the law be the Repre-
sentative of Order that we require, or might it assume the mantle of Trickster that is also
predicted by liminality?
60. Editorial, ‘Polar Exploration: Brexit and the Emerging Frontiers of EU Law’, pp. 1624–1625.
61. G. Laurie, et al., ‘Charting Regulatory Stewardship in Health Research: Making the Invisible
Visible’, Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 27(2) (2018), pp. 333–347.
62. House of Commons Select Committee on Health and Social Care, Brexit: Medicines,
Medical Devices and Substances of Human Origin, at para 45.
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Two examples from health research regulation unpack these ideas more fully. These
are data protection and clinical trials regulation. In both sectors, the reach and influence
of European law has been significant and subject to ongoing reform in the lead up to the
Brexit process.
Data protection
The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)63 applied in all 28 member states of the
EU from May 28, 2018. Manifestly, this date was before any formal departure of the
United Kingdom from the EU, and the United Kingdom must comply fully with EU law
for now. The Data Protection Bill 2017–2019 is proceeding through Westminster at the
time of writing, and it serves as a source for various lessons that arise from this liminal
legislative period. For health research regulation, the GDPR will have a range of
impacts. For example, the regulation now makes processing of personal data on the
grounds of consent a more onerous exercise for those seeking to reply on this provision.
Thus, Article 4 provides:
(11) ‘consent’ of the data subject means any freely given, specific, informed and unambig-
uous indication of the data subject’s wishes by which he or she, by a statement or by a clear
affirmative action, signifies agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or
her [emphasis added].
This represents a very specific, legalistic view of the role of consent that focuses on
the nature of degree of informedness of the data subject. Given that health research is
determinedly open-ended, it will be increasingly difficult to meet this criterion in a
health research context. Moreover, the tradition backstop measure—relying on anon-
ymized information—is also potentially rendered more problematic because the GDPR
now makes pseudonymized data also part of the definition of “personal data” (Article
4(5)). In short, processing on the basis of public interest becomes a far more viable
option for the research community when “personal data” are being used for research.
At present, however, “public interest” is defined very narrowly in the Data Protection
Bill 2017–2019:
In Article 6(1) of the GDPR (lawfulness of processing), the reference in point (e) to
processing of personal data that is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in
the public interest or in the exercise of the controller’s official authority includes pro-
cessing of personal data that is necessary for—
(a) the administration of justice,
(b) the exercise of a function of either House of Parliament,
(c) the exercise of a function conferred on a person by an enactment or rule of law,
63. House of Commons Select Committee on Health and Social Care, Brexit: Medicines,
Medical Devices and Substances of Human Origin, at para 45.
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(d) the exercise of a function of the Crown, a Minister of the Crown, or a govern-
ment department, or
(e) an activity that supports or promotes democratic engagement. (Clause 8)
Not only is there no mention of research in this context, but the list refers to actors and
matters of the same kind (ejusdem generis); thus, as a matter of standard legislative
interpretation and even if this list is nonexhaustive, other examples will also have to be of
the same kind to qualify. On the face of the current draft Bill, it is not at all obvious that
health research would qualify.
So, what does liminality tell us about these processes? The GDPR does not mandate
any particular view of public interest. Moreover, with the prospect of Brexit, it becomes
all the more incumbent on health research stakeholders to lobby Westminster for clearer
explicit mandate within the United Kingdom with respect to processing of data for
research purposes in a proven public interest. More specifically, however, the call for
regulatory alignment itself must be subjected to scrutiny. In the first instance, it clearly
suggests that law—as text—ought to reflect as closely as possible a common position
between the United Kingdom and the EU law. But if we adopt the processual analysis
that liminality encourages, regulatory alignment must be something that itself is seen as
process. This is particularly important with a concept as amorphous as public interest
that is subject to myriad variations of influence and interpretation. How can we ensure
that what counts as public interest (in health research) will align with Continental
European interpretations and values over time? Without the longer-timer oversight of
the CJEU, will “public interest” be determined differently? Who might take advantage of
the removal of one possible avenue of scrutiny of domestic implementation, that is, a
reference to the CJEU?
Notwithstanding, the HC Select Committee signaled its satisfaction with a statement
from Theresa May on March 2, 2018, to the effect:
. . .The free flow of data is also critical for both sides in any modern trading relationship
too. The UK has exceptionally high standards of data protection. And we want to secure an
agreement with the EU that provides the stability and confidence for EU and UK business
and individuals to achieve our aims in maintaining and developing the UK’s strong trading
and economic links with the EU . . . [t]hat is why we will be seeking more than just an
adequacy arrangement and want to see an appropriate ongoing role for the UK’s Informa-
tion Commissioner’s Office. This will ensure UK businesses are effectively represented
under the EU’s new ‘one stop shop’ mechanism for resolving data protection disputes.64
Note, as above, there is subtle yet emphatic regulatory realignment here with respect
to the role of the regulator. Its task becomes not simply one of ensuring stakeholder
compliance with the law but also of acting as our watchdog with respect to the enduring
64. House of Commons Select Committee on Health and Social Care, Brexit: Medicines,
Medical Devices and Substances of Human Origin, at para 109, quoting PM Speech.
Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-speech-on-our-future-
economic-partnership-with-the-european-union (accessed 3 September 2018).
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regulatory alignment of domestic law with its European legal counterpart. This is neither
a neutral nor an apolitical exercise. The Information Commissioner’s Office is being
tasked with the Role of Representative of Order here, both legally and politically. For a
concept as vague and malleable as “public interest”—both generally and in the context
of what it might mean for health research regulation—there will be introduced varying
and potentially competing views about what counts as important. The spectrum of
political and social values that led to Brexit—as manifestly divergent with common
values underpinning the EU project—might equally come to bear on how “public inter-
est” is interpreted in the future. The role, then, of our Representative of Order cannot be
the bare text of law; it will become the context of the regulator interpreting the law.
Clinical trials
This links to the second example in this section: clinical trials. The Clinical Trials
Regulation65 is due to apply in 2019, albeit that a precise date is not yet fixed. This
particular legislative instrument therefore might—or might not—fall within the formal
membership period of the United Kingdom. Other authors in this volume explore the
specifics of the Regulation itself; for present purposes, the example raises a number of
points also predicted by liminality.
Liminality predicts potential social schism, the rise of the trickster, and also mimesis:
copying of behavior. Copying, per se, is not necessarily problematic. There are very
good reasons why the form and function of the Clinical Trials Regulation ought to apply
in the United Kingdom, not least to ensure the continuation of high standards and
approximation with near-markets on the European continent. This was the “almost
unanimous”66 view in the evidence to the HC Select Committee on Health and Social
Care with respect to Brexit: medicines, medical devices, and substances of human origin.
This is no surprise. Liminality also suggests that this “copying” will happen, at least in
the first instance. As with the previous example, this phenomenon is captured in the
phrase “regulatory alignment,” and the call is as strong in the clinical trials section as
with data protection.
Equally, because liminality is typified by anti-structure, that is, the upending of the
existing norms and structures—we must be alert to the possibility that any initial align-
ment might not hold. For clinical trials, for example, the prospect of Brexit might be seen
in some quarters as an opportunity to reject the Sudden Unexplained Serious Adverse
Reaction (SUSARs) regime (seen by some some as generating unnecessary white noise
in data reporting)67 or as a chance to decouple the clinical trials regime from links with
65. Council Directive 95/46/EC of October 24, 1995, on the protection of individuals with regard
to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data [1995].
66. House of Commons Select Committee on Health and Social Care, Brexit: Medicines,
Medical Devices and Substances of Human Origin, at para 18.
67. For discussion, see A. Mascolo, et al., ‘Can Causality Assessment Fulfill the New European
Definition of Adverse Drug Reaction? A Review of Methods Used in Spontaneous
Reporting’, Pharmacological Research 123 (2017), pp. 122–129; S. Wallace, et al.,
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Good Clinical Practice Guidelines.68 This would fit with the narratives of “taking back
control” that were so influential in the lead up to the Brexit referendum. In contrast, the
HC Select Committee has recommended that
The UK should aim to have a seat at the International Council on Harmonisation of Tech-
nical Requirements of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (ICH) in its own right. We call on
the Government to confirm that it will apply for full membership of the ICH at the earliest
possible opportunity and to set out its timeline for doing so.69
This, however, is a soft option that would carry neither full political weight nor any
legal basis for automatic entry for the United Kingdom. As a further liminal process to be
navigated, the opportunities to influence and derail such efforts are considerable.
We can only speculate as to the processes by which the UK government might seek
regulatory alignment on clinical trials; this might be treated as retained EU law or the
United Kingdom might pursue primary legislation. Pragmatically, the operational down-
stream implications are considerable, including ongoing access to the European database
on SUSARs and to demonstrate compliance more generally. Insufficient alignment by
the United Kingdom on its chosen path of clinical trials regulation might rapidly and
devastatingly impact on patient health and access to medicines. As with data protection,
an overt role for a Representative of Order here to police effective alignment will be
crucial. Specifically in this sector this is likely to be the MHRA. More broadly, however,
given that the actual path to regulatory alignment will require further legislative action, it
will also put increased responsibility on Parliament to police the constitutional dimen-
sions of the process—raising important questions about the relationship between Parlia-
ment and the post-Brexit Government, including whether and how the Westminster
Parliament might have more direct relationship with European institutions in discharge
of its oversight function with respect to the robustness of any alignment exercise that is
sought through domestic legislation.70
As this section demonstrates, because liminality predicts the potential rise of trickster
in all liminal moments, there is a need to be alert to this at each of the macro-, meso-, and
micro-level of regulation. While there might be valid reasons to advocate the United
Kingdom pursuing an evermore divergent path from the EU, these reasons must be
subjected to extremely careful scrutiny. Their telos must be clearly identified and jus-
tified, and proponents must be able to demonstrate the integrity of their motives. This is
‘Serious Adverse Event Reporting in Investigator-Initiated Clinical Trials’,Medical Journal
of Australia 204(6) (2016), pp. 231–233.
68. See Academy of Medical Sciences, Regulation and Governance of Health Research: Five
Years On (2017). Available at: https://acmedsci.ac.uk/publications (accessed 3 September
2018).
69. House of Commons Select Committee on Health and Social Care, Brexit: Medicines,
Medical Devices and Substances of Human Origin, at para 35.
70. See further, M. Gordon, ‘Brexit: The Relationship Between the UK Parliament and the UK
Government’ in Dougan (2017), Polar Exploration: Brexit and the Emerging Frontiers of EU
Law, Common Market Law Review, pp. 15–33.
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not to belie the motives of those who have criticized the EU regimes to date, and the
advent of both the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the Clinical Trials
Regulation (CTR) are both explicit acknowledgements of serious weaknesses in the
predecessor Directives. Notwithstanding, the EU regimes to date are largely tried and
tested. When it comes both to the context of the enduring liminality of Brexit for the
whole of the UK economy and social structure, we must not be naive to imagine that
political and economic pressure will not be brought to bear also on the health research
sector.
What is the role of law in managing the chaos of the Brexit process, seen as an
aspect of liminality?
The legal regimes represented by data protection and clinical trials are among the most
complex within the EU system. In terms of Brexit, however, they represent a mere tiny
fraction of the myriad ways that EU laws and regulations permeate the legal systems of
the United Kingdom. While it is understandable, then, that the EUWithdrawal Bill 2017
provides that: “[d]irect EU legislation, so far as operative immediately before exit day,
forms part of domestic law on and after exit day” (Clause 31), once again, a liminal
analysis offers some insights on what this legislative action represents.
As stated above, liminality—in the face of uncertainty—often results in mimesis
(copying). The Withdrawal Bill must go down as the most manifest example of this in
history. But, so what? The reader might ask. Well, mimesis in a strict anthropological
and sociological sense is also characterized by unreflexive behavior.71 For this reason,
one of the most important recommendations of the HC Select Committee on Health and
Social Care bears repeating:
We recommend that the nature and level of UK ‘regulatory drift’ in the life science sector
from the EU be systematically assessed at regular intervals by current and future UK
Governments, in order to prevent issues over a lack of harmonisation occurring in the
future.72
This is all the more important for the Withdrawal Bill. Liminality requires us to
follow the process through and out of the other side. And so, where will the Withdrawal
Bill lead? Two core concerns in this regard emerge.
First, consider a subsequent clause in the 2017 Bill. Clause 6(3) states:
Any question as to the validity, meaning, or effect of any retained EU law is to be
decided, so far as that law is unmodified on or after exit day and so far as they are
relevant to it—
71. Thomassen, Liminality and the Modern: Living Through the In-Between, pp. 102–103.
72. House of Commons Select Committee on Health and Social Care, Brexit: Medicines,
Medical Devices and Substances of Human Origin, at para 73.
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(a) in accordance with any retained case law and any retained general principles of
EU law and
(b) having regard (among other things) to the limits, immediately before exit day, of
EU competences.
In other words, the United Kingdom’s interpretation of the legacy of EU law will be
fixed—frozen in permanent liminality—at the date of exit. UK courts will not be
required to follow the evolution of EU law over time, although equally they are at liberty
to do so. In areas as important, sensitive and highly dynamic such as health and health
research regulation, the chasms might soon appear and could quickly grow. This Bill
ossifies EU law at a particular moment in time, leaving the United Kingdom at the same
time both part of the history of the EU, while potentially bearing less and less similarity
to what the EU will inevitably evolve to become. Everything will depend on the future
UK-EU relationship. One answer to a concern about divergence might be to refer to the
Norwegian-EU relationship: bluntly, courts in Norway have to follow the acquis com-
munautaire. However, at the time of writing a Norway-type model seems increasingly
unlikely, and the kind of European Court of Justice oversight that flows from this close
relationship remains a very red line for the United Kingdom, as demonstrated by
repeated official announcements.73
The “discretion” to be afforded to UK courts—possibly to follow EU law in some
areas and maybe not in others—simply strengthens the charge here that significant areas
of the Brexit process run a risk of permanent liminality or at least enduring chaos for a
considerable time.
A possible answer to this point might be to refer to Clause 7(1):
A Minister of the Crown may by regulations make such provision as the Minister
considers appropriate to prevent, remedy, or mitigate—
(a) any failure of retained EU law to operate effectively, or
(b) any other deficiency in retained EU law, arising from the withdrawal of the
United Kingdom from the EU.
However, quite apart from the considerable ambiguity, uncertainty, and potential
constitutional crisis that looms at the prospect of such draconian powers, this provision
merely legislates for future liminal hotspots. The same risks as identified above will
reemerge. The unfettered discretion embodied in this provision suggests that there is
little knowable telos for Ministerial actions; it is unknowable who might be affected by
the said actions—and so who will be thrust into liminality; there is no mention or
reference to rights (rites?) to protect citizens subjected to such powers; and there is the
ever-present concern about abuse by trickster figures.
Such poorly drafted law can itself be seen as a trickster in the Brexit process. Law, at
its best, acts as the consummate representative of order—standing objectively outside of
73. UK government official documentation can be found here. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/
government/publications?departments%5B%5D¼department-for-exiting-the-european-
union (accessed 3 September 2018).
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social processes affecting individuals and guiding them dispassionately toward socially
valued ends. The EU Withdrawal Bill has none of these traits.
Conclusion: Does liminality help us to deal with Brexit?
Matters that profoundly affect human values such as health and human health research
move forward rapidly, unceasingly, and unevenly. Health research regulation is among
some of the most tightly regulated areas of human activity and for good reason. The EU
has instigated, and maintains, one of the most robust and high-quality regimes that exists
anywhere in the world. While far from perfect, these regimes consistently deliver
research within the highest ethical parameters.
The impact of the Brexit process on health research in the United Kingdom, and
more particularly on its regulation, is necessarily uncertain. This must be a cause for
concern. This article has offered the perspective of liminality to suggest that it is
nonetheless possible to anticipate and prepare for possible features that will emerge
from this uncertain Brexit process as a quintessential liminal moment in (European)
human history. Liminality—typified by transition and change—is a universal human
experience; as such there are good reasons to expect that these predictions have
some basis. Liminality is often chaotic, and the purpose is to lead people out of
liminality. To do this—whether at the macro level of the future status of the United
Kingdom or at the micro level of particular regulatory regimes—a clear end point
(telos) must be identified. Liminality is also typified by mimetic behavior, and while
this explains the wholesale adoption of EU law into domestic law by the EU
Withdrawal Bill 2017, this particular legislative move signally fails to reflect the
processual element in these dynamics. Rather, it ossifies EU law within the United
Kingdom’s future legal framework; the solution to move beyond this is arguably
worse: the 2017 Bill offers unspecified, obscure, and undemocratic powers to face-
less bureaucrats. For citizens facing the liminality of the Brexit process, this sug-
gests that the need for a representative of order has never been greater. Moreover,
liminal processes predict the emergence of tricksters who seek to take advantage of
uncertainty and emerging chaos. In the health research context, this means that it is
all the more incumbent on local agents and actors—such as current regulators—to
assume the role of representatives of order. The task is to protect citizens and
promote health research in the future United Kingdom in ways that do justice to
its history as a member state of the EU and which will represent a fitting regime for
whatever partnership emerges from the Brexit process.
As to the role of law itself in these processes, liminality predicts that it will not deliver
salvation or even much clarity from the chaos. Liminality is an essential human expe-
rience, and we will have to learn to live with extended periods of time where we only
have questions and too few answers. Law cannot predict or determine the future as much
as we would like; indeed, as demonstrated by various examples from theWithdrawal Bill
itself, the law might be cast in the role of trickster. Equally, a liminal lens does not reveal
a clear path forward in our desperate desire to understand. Liminality does, however,
alert us to the nature of the processes ahead and remind us that a reversion to law for
comfort is a misguided step. This is a mess of our own making.
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